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INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship, conventionally understood, is a process where opportunity recognition precedes prototype development (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) . In the case of user entrepreneurship, however, this process is reversed: users first develop prototypes and, while using and gaining experience with the new design, recognize a potential for commercialization of their product 1 or service (Shah and Tripsas, 2007) . Thus, user entrepreneurship can be seen as taking a position within a standing debate in entrepreneurship theory about the discovery or creation of opportunities Barney, 2005, 2007; Sarasvathy, 2001 Sarasvathy, , 2004 by describing entrepreneurial opportunities as created in use. Generally showing traits of user innovators (von Hippel, 1988) , user entrepreneurs derive their designs from existing products or technologies. If commercial value is created in a different industry from that in which the original product was located, we should expect new challenges connected to technology diffusion and knowledge recombination (Geroski, 2000) . The aim of this paper is to fill a gap in the fast growing literature on user entrepreneurship, by theorizing about the process of user entrepreneurship as users move from one industry to another in order to commercialize.
User entrepreneurs face low opportunity costs and exhibit a high willingness to experiment and high potential to explore commercial opportunities by entering existing markets or creating new ones, especially when the target markets are turbulent and demand is uncertain (Shah and Tripsas, 2007) . Usually embedded in a community of users with similar needs, user entrepreneurs operate under favorable conditions: the community plays a vital role in diffusing new designs while user entrepreneurs are granted early access to feedback and information relevant to commercialization prior to firm foundation (Shah and Tripsas, 2007) .
Examples of user entrepreneurship have been studied in the fields of sporting equipment (Baldwin et al., 2006; Luthje et al., 2005; Franke and Shah, 2003) and juvenile products (Shah and Tripsas, 2007) . Both fields present cases where commercialization occurred in the industry in which the original user activity took place. In the case of juvenile products, dissatisfied parents innovated more sophisticated designs, like a stroller that can be used while jogging, which they eventually commercialized after other parents became aware of its superior performance. In the case of rodeo kayaking, users redesigned kayaks to better perform under extremely challenging conditions. In either case, user entrepreneurs developed new concepts on the back of existing products. They demonstrated and promoted their designs in competitions. In scanning for products that satisfied their needs prior to developing their own, user entrepreneurs gained familiarity with the general market structure and the competitive environment of their industry.
Products and services are fungible in their application. They can be modified, developed, or reinterpreted to be used as a tool or basis for new products in another context (Faulkner and Runde, 2009; von Hippel, 1988) . User entrepreneurs may shift the use activity from one industry to another or, to put it differently, diffuse technology across industries through different use (cf. Rogers, 1962) . Research has so far neglected this important aspect: user entrepreneurs who develop products based on assets from one industry, which they apply as complementary assets in the industry where they commercialize. Based on a study of the Machinima phenomenon, a new animation genre, and a sample of firms started by users, we develop a new process model of user entrepreneurship across industries. The firms in our sample apply video games as production technology for animation and commercialize their films via online distribution or DVD sales in the animation production industry, a subdivision of the motion picture industry. In the 1990s, user innovators started to record their game play and introduced recording technology to video games, transforming their use (Faulkner and Runde, 2009) . With the publication of the first Machinima films, shot in video games, the technology became amenable to story telling that extended beyond the story elements contained in the game. User entrepreneurs publish animated shorts 2 using video games as production technology and create opportunities to commercialize from their experience with Machinima. Figure 1 shows the process of user entrepreneurship in two phases as we observe and develop it in this paper, where an initial user innovation in industry A enables user entrepreneurs to enter industry B, in a first phase, under the radar of incumbents and, in a second phase, to commercialize animated shorts based on the new use of a technology from industry A. For example Rooster Teeth Productions, a Machinima firm in our sample, made use of the game Halo, produced by Microsoft/Bungie, to create a Machinima franchise 3 called Red vs. Blue under which they publish episodes online. Based on their experience and audience gained, they subsequently sold DVDs, sponsorship access, and merchandising. existing products experience use restrictions as obstacles to commercialization. Relying on third party assets complicates commercialization; intellectual property rights attached to either modified products or assets remain with the original producer and create legal uncertainty for the user entrepreneur (Depoorter, 2009) . Companies holding the IP of products affected by such user activity may show tolerance toward the application of their assets (Harhoff et al., 2003) ; otherwise, permission may be granted through a variety of means, such as research exemption in the field of science (O'Rourke, 2000; Strandburg, 2008) , fair use under US copyright law, or the growing practice of (informal) unauthorized use of copyright material (Lee, 2008) .
While firms in the industry where the original user activity was located (industry A) may apply and enforce patents or copyright to secure profits in their home market, they might adopt a more lenient position toward others' exploitation of these assets in industries where they do not compete (industry B), especially given the high cost and effort of monitoring and enforcing intellectual property rights (Liebeskind, 1996) . Hence, firms may be willing to share selectively and tolerate the application of specific assets that are core to their "home" market but complementary in other markets, and so provide user entrepreneurs with a foundation to commercialize.
The knowledge needed to commercialize in another industry's markets may extend beyond the knowledge acquired in use and, possibly, beyond the experience available through the community of users (Baldwin et al., 2006) . Domain knowledge important to commercialization includes market-relevant education and experience, production techniques, work flows and processes, insights about genres and market demand, and industry-specific marketing knowledge. We study commercialization by user entrepreneurs outside the industry where the products they use We examine this question in the motion picture industry, which represents an ideal context to study user entrepreneurship, considering Shah and Tripsas' (2007) proposition that markets with high turbulence and demand uncertainty favor user entrepreneurship: besides a huge mainstream market for theatrical film production, several niche markets within the industry are in a state of revolt due to technological advances. Today, major studios show little interest in providing content for the Internet even though there is excess demand for it and customers are willing to pay. Industry analysts have commented that the low profitability of the Internet market, compared to their mainstream business, has meant that major studios have missed the opportunity to develop sustainable business models to serve online customers (Papies and Clement, 2008) . This neglect may prove critical as the Internet is gaining in importance as an outlet for media content (Scott, 2004; Yoon and Malecki, 2009) . Furthermore, it is till unknown whether theatrical and non-theatrical outlets substitute or complement each other (Eliashberg, et al., 2006) . "The development of new delivery systems will in principle open up the market to more effective contestation by smaller independent film production and distribution companies (cf. Leyshon, 2001 ). Thus, the eventual attainment of film distribution by means of the Internet will no doubt give rise to a great increase in the amount of cinematic material available to consumers, thereby widening the market and almost certainly making inroads on blockbuster audiences" (Scott, 2004: 58) .
The motion picture industry can expect to see new entrants from the video game industry since both industries show similar characteristics and boundaries are blurring (Calantone, et al., 2010; Eliashberg, et al., 2006; Yoon and Malecki, 2009) . The animation industry is probably the closest link to the video game industry, in that both share substantial talents (Aoyama and Izushi, 2003; Izushi and Aoyama, 2006) . With the increasing digitalization of the value chain, entry barriers to the animation industry are lowering, enabling everyone with a personal computer to participate (Eliashberg, et al., 2006) . Internet and animation production technologies overlap (Britton, et al. 2009 ). Producing animated shorts is considered a point of entry for small studios that might later attract a growing audience. Being able to shift among markets means that these animation studios can eventually move into feature films, as AKOM demonstrated with The Simpsons (Yoon and Malecki, 2009 ).
Our study extends work on user entrepreneurship by defining core constructs and explaining the commercialization patterns of users who create or enter new markets in different industries.
Effectual strategies that assume that opportunities emerge when created by an entrepreneur have been positively associated with venture performance (Read et al., 2009) . We pay special attention to the strategies users follow to remedy legal uncertainty when applying borrowed assets, the new knowledge they need to acquire, and the support they receive from their community of peers.
Based on case studies, we inductively generate a model describing key elements of the strategies user entrepreneurs follow when commercializing products or services in new and economically relevant markets.
After introducing our research design, we describe the relevant cases and present the results of our study in the form of descriptive propositions. We conclude with a discussion of our findings, the implications for research, management, and policy, and outline a future research agenda for user entrepreneurship and strategy.
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Machinima offered an ideal context to explore the research question of this paper because (1) user entrepreneurs could be observed entering the animation industry 4 over the past ten years while the genre was in the process of emerging; (2) the animation industry was traditionally characterized by high entry barriers, leading to "creative" entry strategies; (3) Machinima production involves proprietary software as well as artwork, allowing a nuanced observation of how users manage IP conflicts; (4) users frequently possess advanced gaming skills but need to acquire film production knowledge to sustain a business in the target industry; and (5) users display high variance in their entrepreneurial approaches over time, ranging from product sales to diversification into consulting, software development, and online services.
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Our research comprised three phases: case sampling, data gathering, and data analysis. We conducted a multiple, non-embedded case study (Yin, 2003) , and gathered data from seven firms within the Machinima community representing the entire population of Machinima-based businesses at the time of this study. We follow an inductive logic to theorize about industry entry and market fragmentation by user entrepreneurs and generate propositions derived from the cases (Cohen, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) . Theory development on a small sample size has been discussed by March et al. (1991) , Eisenhardt (1989) , and Siggelkow (2007) , while exemplary works with the methodology include Vaughn (1990), Lawrence et al., (2002), and Pervez et al. (2008) . Eisenhardt (1989: 545) proposes "a number between four and ten cases to usually work well" and allows for sufficient complexity without creating too much data. Such a sample size allows researchers to describe and analyze the cases in a systematic and methodical manner, leading to thorough contextual interpretation.
4 According to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.4 (ISIC), software game development (6201) belongs to another industry than motion picture production and distribution (5911, 5912 and 5913, 6020 respectively). The first two digits are sometimes used to denote a specific industry. (See Farjoun, 1994 , for a discussion of the relatedness of industries in terms of knowledge, an aspect we use to define complementary assets and show the market entry.) 5 A number of publications (Marino, 2004; Morris et al., 2005; Hancock & Ingram, 2007) cover the topic of Machinima for the general reader.
Sample
The production of animated films used to be restricted to media professionals who could afford the expensive software packages needed. These restrictions led users in the animation industry to produce films with games, inspired by innovative gamers who developed methods to record their game play. Such games are relatively cheap compared to traditional production tools. In addition, most of the in-game assets, like characters and landscapes that resemble actors and scenes, are already available, thus reducing overall production cost and time.
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Defined as "shooting film in a realtime 3d environment" (AMAS, see footnote 6), Machinima is
(1) a production technology, and (2) Interviewees brought these seven firms, which we later identified as the population, to our attention as predominant examples of Machinima-based commercialization. Thus, we defined "successful" Machinima firms according to informants (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) . All seven firms had produced Machinima films and won at least one award at an AMAS Film Festival. 7 Three started by producing animation and continued to do so; another three altered their sources of revenue after having produced Machinima; and one firm, Machinima.com, started producing animation later on to supplement their portfolio. Thus, all firms once entered the animation industry. Of the three firms that altered their sources or revenue, one chose to turn away from Machinima. We conducted literal and theoretical replication (Yin, 2003) by considering firms with operations in the animation industry as well as firms that developed alternative sources of revenue different than, but still based on, the Machinima production experience. The fact that user entrepreneurs show a tendency to display their capabilities at championships (Baldwin et al., 7 The resulting sample combines all incorporated Machinima businesses that were at least a year old. Their common denominator is the entry of its founders into the animation industry as Machinima users at one point in time, ultimately leading to commercialization. The firms differ in terms of their commercialization activities, financing, size, age, ambitions, and goals. We also included one firm that discontinued its Machinima-related revenue source.
Data gathering
Data gathering took place in five phases, including both real-time observations and retrospective data (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) . Desk research delivered insights on how the user community defined itself, who participated, the motives of the different users, and (most importantly) active firms as well as those that had ceased operation. Understanding the phenomenon helped us establish more effective relations with key informants. Hosting Machinima films, we retrieved plenty of information from community websites 9 including the names of the producer, the director, and the year of publication. Moreover, some of the films and credit files provided information about the production process, individuals, and firms involved. Altogether, we read 32
articles, studied a 340-page report on the video game industry, watched more than 100 short films, and browsed roughly 50 web pages to gain a thorough understanding of the phenomenon (for the use of rich information sources, see Vaughan, 1990 ).
Second, one of the authors participated in a four-day Machinima workshop to conduct field observations and build relations with the Machinima community. The workshop covered the entire Machinima production process and the author created a film to gain first-hand experience of the process.
Third, in November 2006, we identified interviewees from a variety of backgrounds and began semi-structured interviews. This approach allowed us to react to replies and adapt the questions to a candidate's profile. We usually started the interview with questions about an individual's background and education to decide later on whether the interviewee was an objective observer or a key informant on a topic. The initial set of questions, based mainly on desk research, was tested during the workshop. The questionnaire was subsequently refined and tailored to the specific background of each interviewee, based on information taken from online résumés or previous interviews.
Fourth, before entering the second round of interviews we analyzed our preliminary results.
Having a general understanding of Machinima and the community that supported it, we focused on user entrepreneurs, some of their legal advisors, user innovators who played an important role during the development of Machinima-people who provided valuable background information, and finally games companies to complement the picture. From February to March 2007 we completed seven interviews, one face-to-face, and another six conducted by telephone (see Table   A2 in the Appendix for a full list and description of interview partners).
Fifth, another author traveled to New York and Texas and conducted a total of ten interviews and participant observation during a week on site with Rooster Teeth Productions, the ILL Clan, Fountainhead, and an ESC representative. Daily records of working routines, the Machinima production process, and other office tasks were kept; notes were taken while attending meetings, lunch, and evening events (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) . Five formal interviews were conducted, three of which were recorded on video for later analysis and classroom use. In addition, more than 100 photographs of Machinima working environments were taken during the field trip.
In total we conducted 25 interviews, 21 in English and four in German, each lasting 55 minutes on average. We transcribed 19 interviews (20-30 pages each) verbatim. In addition, we crosschecked relevant information with other interview data or facts from desk research incorporating external links and comments in the text.
Data analysis
We compiled individual case studies, based on the data gathered from the five phases. First, bearing in mind the process of traditional user entrepreneurship from existing literature, the data were pre-screened to derive a common coding scheme (see Appendix). Our interviewees' frequent and unexpected references to IP issues and legal uncertainty indicated that the entire process of commercialization was greatly influenced by the legal aspects of game engine use.
Hence, we considered relevant literature in this field to support the coding scheme.
A rough sketch of what industry entry involved supported us in describing the phenomenon to interviewees. We then coded the transcribed interviews using MAXQDA, a software tool for text analysis. While analyzing the interviews, we coded statements in the text, which allowed us to sort and evaluate information. Two researchers working in parallel conducted the coding. After the initial coding, results were merged and the second coder recoded selected interviews, contributing to inter-coder reliability.
Applying an iterative process with an overlap of data analysis and data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) , we used the distilled interview data, including the codes and the higher code categories (e.g.: 2 Domain Knowledge, 2.1 Education, 2.2 Work experience, 2.3
Prior Film Production), as well as secondary information, to refine our case studies by gathering additional data whenever gaps were identified during coding. We evaluated the interview data and compared coding of key informants (e.g., director) with objective observers' (e.g., lawyer) views where applicable. We triangulated the findings from the interviews with our observation records (Pettigrew, 1988) , independent information gathered from the Internet, image, and video material, and third-party newspaper articles. We produced detailed case write-ups for each firm to cope with the magnitude of data. While structuring and analyzing the within-case data, we checked whether information depicting every construct was obtained for each case. This led us to drop one early construct but to formulate another, enabling further consolidation of the coding scheme. The final case study write-ups facilitated the comparison of all ventures' positions in terms of user entrepreneurship. Searching for cross-case patterns enabled us to extract the general sequence of actions users followed to commercialize their products or services as well as to identify the different stakeholders or stakeholder groups involved in the different phases of the commercialization process (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Based on the flow of actions, we derived five propositions and drew up a table summarizing the findings for each (see Table 2 ). To enhance construct validity, all propositions were compared and discussed in the light of the existing literature. The maintenance of individual case studies during the analysis supported replication across firms. A final working paper was sent to all informants for comments and feedback, which were integrated with the text.
TOWARD A PROCESS MODEL OF INDUSTRY ENTRY BY USER ENTREPRENEURS
In this section we present findings on how, in the case of Machinima, users become entrepreneurs who commercialize their products or services based on assets from another industry in a twophase process. We inductively develop a model from the cases and formulate five propositions (Table 2) to explain user entrepreneurs' behavior and the consequences of their activities ( Figure   2 , explained throughout the text). We emphasize the interactions between user entrepreneurs and firms that selectively share complementary assets, between user entrepreneurs and their community of peers who exchange knowledge about the application of complementary assets, and between user entrepreneurs and talent from the motion picture industry to acquire domain knowledge. First, we describe the context of industry entry, which occurred in two phases. 
Under the radar of incumbent firms: A two-phase process of industry entry
The first phase of industry entry consists of a lateral move from one industry to another under the radar of incumbents: When first applying video games as tools to produce animated shorts, users emerged from the domain of the video game industry to enter and become producers in the animation industry where they used games as alien production tools-most of them continuing to be avid gamers. Neither companies in the video game nor in the animation industry paid attention to or followed the activities of these "hobbyists" who operated on a very small scale of product development (cp. Depoorter, 2009 ), which we consider under the radar. At the same time, video game companies were harsh with users who altered or modified video games regardless of the scope of modifications or their commercial intention (AC, CB). The same holds true for film production companies that saw their media assets re-used and or distributed over the Internet.
The following quote from Geoff Ramsey (GR) illustrates how the founders of Rooster Teeth started out to reach an audience from a spare-time activity and moved on to a full-time activity, following the success they achieved in terms of audience and attention received. 
-shirt, just a white T-shirt with a logo on it, would you be interested in buying it? And the response was overwhelming. And so I made a T-shirt and people bought it." (GR)
In phase two, user entrepreneurs experimented with various ways to commercialize their ideas.
Rooster Teeth introduced merchandising to help offset costs, besides DVD sales, an increasingly popular revenue window in the motion picture industry in times when box office sales do not suffice to break even provided the production costs (Eliashberg et al., 2006; Wasko et al., 1993; Yoon and Malecki, 2009) . Table 1 summarizes the activities undertaken by the firms in our sample during under-the-radar entry to the animation industry (phase one) and first opportunity recognition and commercialization strategies (phase two).
It is important to note here is that the user entrepreneurs were the producers as well as the distributors, exhibitors, and the licensees of their own merchandise-roles usually separated along the value chain or at least split into various subdivisions of corporate groups in the motion picture industry. Thus, user entrepreneurs in our case entered several related industries subsequently based on potential business opportunities they recognized during display of their core product, the Machinima films.
Wendy Selzer (WS), of Brooklyn Law School, explained the critical legal situation in which user entrepreneurs found themselves when entering phase two. Here, their foremost concern is the uncertainty regarding a potential legal dispute with the game companies: Operating within uncertain legal boundaries, resulting from the copyright restrictions that came with the video games, made access to distribution channels anything but easy. TV networks exerted pressure on user entrepreneurs by passing on the legal clarification regarding copyright infringement (WS). User entrepreneurs in our sample (AK, MK, CB, PM) reported having experienced conservative reactions to Machinima from industry incumbents such as TV networks and film studios. This negative attitude meant they had either to seek alternative sources of revenue or obtain explicit permission from IP holders.
Asset holders' preference for selective sharing of proprietary assets (industry A)
Dependency on video games as complementary assets for animation production (see Teece, 1986) complicated industry entry by user entrepreneurs for a number of reasons. Game engines (movements in 3D space, sound, artificial intelligence, look-and-feel, etc.) and artwork (settings, scenery, characters, skins, textures) represent significant investments by companies in the game industry. Copyright law and EULAs protect these assets, prohibiting any (commercial) application of the acquired video game or the artwork that comes with it. These copyright agreements made it difficult if not impossible for user entrepreneurs to sell their Machinima films directly (see also Marino, 2004; Hancock and Ingram, 2007) . Fred von Lohmann (FvL), IP lawyer at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, clarified the difference in copyright for the two main components of a game, the engine and the assets. While copyright on the assets is closely defined and attributed to the creator, the output generated by the game engine is far from easy to classify and thus vulnerable to lawsuits, giving user entrepreneurs little leeway to negotiate with distributors: Users solved the dilemma of uncertainty in two ways: they either negotiated a contract with the game company who granted use and thus selectively shared game assets for clearly defined purposes, or they remodeled large parts of the game. While the ILL Clan and Strange Company applied specialized tools to "re-skin" avatars and avoid using existing artwork, Rooster Teeth struck a deal, which allowed them to use the artwork from Halo for their Red vs. Blue franchise.
We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of either strategy later. Burnie Burns of Rooster Another approach was to create large amounts of artwork from scratch. The ILL Clan pioneered this work with their film Hardly Workin' for which "we changed the entire look of the game" (PM), accomplished by two members during two years of part-time work. Shooting the film, which involved five people, and integrating the improvisors' dialogs, took a further six months.
Creating own assets by modifying the game gave confidence of not infringing any IP rights, as Paul Marino (PM) and Frank Dellario (FD) described: 
"Quake allowed you to re-skin your characters, that was one of the things that id Software did … that was a very innovative approach to customizing the game and […] we used this feature to do that for our film." (PM)
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Thus, we propose (1): If firms (in other industries) show a preference toward selective sharing of proprietary assets, this positively impacts the user entrepreneurs' access to complementary assets for commercialization.
User entrepreneurs often first use complementary assets regardless of potential IP infringements (phase one) and later recognize an opportunity to commercialize (phase two)-a central finding in the user entrepreneurship process. The failure of asset holders to approve the commercial application of complementary assets may represent a road-block for user entrepreneurs, since access to complementary assets is critical for commercialization, even if access is granted ex post (the initial use).
User entrepreneurs' access to complementary assets for commercialization (industry B)
User entrepreneurs need access to a range of complementary assets, including those of game companies, as we discussed in the previous section. We now relate these assets to commercialization. The process of finding and locating relevant assets in the video game industry to match with a story and produce a film is illustrated by Burnie Burns (BB) of Rooster Teeth: 
" (BB)
All firms in the sample used and relied on complementary assets such as game engines, tool sets, and artwork stemming from video games, which were incorporated in the production process. In some cases, the artwork even stimulated the innovation process (BB). 
"One of the biggest issues with Machinima is that there is a big debate about copyright issues, because when people are making videos, using games made by professional game companies, they say, well, you know, you're using our sounds, you're using our assets, you're using our animations, our levels and so on. And everybody in the Machinima community is waiting for the first big lawsuit to happen and one of the things we decided was just to move around this by saying, well, we intend to own the engine, the assets, maps and everything so when somebody makes a movie with Moviestorm, they own it. In just the same way that they would own anything they created with Word or Photoshop." (MK)
Fountainhead quickly ceased to commercialize animation despite its access to complementary assets that allowed it to create groundbreaking Machinima early on. Machinima.com stands alone, due to its special role as a web platform supporting the community 12 in various ways, ranging from hosting to education. The remaining four firms, however, lend support to our second proposition by relying on complementary assets for their commercialization strategy.
12 Because Machinima.com did not start commissioning films until the end of August 2007, after we interviewed their CEO Philip DeBevoise, we have not considered Machinima.com for some of our propositions.
Thus, we propose (2): User entrepreneurs' access to complementary assets positively impacts commercialization.
Proposition two also reflects the two-phase process, since access to complementary assets is provided by user innovators, whom we regard as separate from user entrepreneurs, as well as the game companies' willingness to share these assets.
For completeness, it should be noted that while complementary assets play a crucial role in creating Machinima, they do not replace the creation of original artwork like voice-over and audio effects by user entrepreneurs. The integration of assets, artwork, and potential postproduction with the actual shooting requires considerable skill and experience in making
Machinima all in areas of domain knowledge, which we turn to next.
Acquisition of new domain knowledge
Critical new domain knowledge for commercialization represents the qualification necessary not only to produce but also to distribute animation shot in video games that appeals to a greater audience. It includes education and experience in cinematography, the creation of a narrative, screenwriting, post-production and editing skills, as well as knowledge of the film business such as marketing, reaching an audience, creating sequels, and sustaining the interest of an audience in film characters and stories-in other words, the creative skills that are crucial to producing any kind of film, including Machinima. The application of complementary assets refers to the users' technical skills at applying and exploiting given features in a video game, such as specialized tools to reshape the appearance of characters, puppeteering, or the capturing of raw video material, basically all functions related to execution.
Friedrich Kirschner (FK), member of the AMAS, explained early approaches to production knowledge exchange as being part of the maturing Machinima community. Knowing each other's work well, users exchanged experiences and opinions during film festivals (AMAS, Sundance, Tribeca, Bitfilm, and others), game conferences, and via online discussion forums (Machinima.com and others). Some even wrote Machinima beginners' books about their specific production knowledge (Hancock and Ingram, 2007; Marino, 2004) Despite the importance of domain knowledge, commercializing Machinima seemed to rely on the user entrepreneurs' ability to combine domain knowledge and experience with complementary assets. Users of video games approached animation production in new ways (Lowood, 2007; Marino, 2004) regarding their use of technical tools and cinematography, as Matt Kelland (MK) of Short Fuze commented. The crew at Short Fuze knew that there were important trade-offs when making animation with games or with user experience of gamers. Moviestorm, a game-like animation production environment, caters to users who want to produce Machinima but have little or no film-related education or experience:
"As a game player, my preconception is 'I don't have to do anything, the computer just works it all out for me.' And it may not be exactly what I want, but it's good enough and it was easy. Whereas an animator would say, well you have to be able to decide where they walk and how they walk and get it all absolutely right, which we say, it actually doesn't matter." (MK)
Our cases demonstrate that a community of users positively impacts on the accumulation of relevant domain knowledge from different industries. We can observe an important distinction between user innovators and user entrepreneurs. User innovators, within a community or by themselves, combine complementary assets (video games) with cinematography skill (e.g.
Randall Glass with his film Warthog Jump, published in 2002, achieving effects once thought impossible). User entrepreneurs, however, take their animation products one step further and commercialize them in the animation industry. Depending on the user entrepreneurs' origin, the respective other domain knowledge has to be acquired.
To commercialize Machinima, user entrepreneurs need to combine domain knowledge with their skills at applying complementary assets. Consider again the example of Rooster Teeth: the tale of their successful series starts with the discovery of a bug in Microsoft's Halo game that allowed them to make their avatars look straight ahead while pointing their guns down. This non-feature enabled the dialogue scenes in Red vs. Blue. The deep experience with a video game, the cinematographic skill to exploit this bug artistically to create entertaining products, and the business knowledge of how to market the product need to come together for commercialization.
All of our cases show that access to both kinds of knowledge-domain knowledge as well as experience and skills-is necessary for commercialization.
We propose (3a): The community of users positively impacts on user entrepreneurs' skills at applying complementary assets.
The ability of all firms to generate revenue could be traced to talent from the motion picture industry, whether by temporary arrangements, hiring, or via the founders. We thus propose (3b):
Access to the talent pool of the target industry positively impacts on user entrepreneurs' acquisition of domain knowledge.
Note that this finding is compelling in the sense that all but one user entrepreneur followed this course and phase one (under the radar) appeared as a prerequisite for phase two. Understanding how to produce Machinima film and the experience as users of Machinima tools, the insights gained from a community of peers, and the knowledge to be gained in the domain of the animation industry, all contribute to the possibility of entering phase two, commercialization.
In summary, commercialization was impossible, in our sample, without the combined knowledge of the domain of filmmaking and of the application of games as complementary assets to film production. We propose (4): User entrepreneurs combine domain knowledge with the skills to apply complementary assets to commercialize their products. Table 2 gives a summary of the propositions and how they relate to the respective firms, with a short description of how each proposition is supported throughout the cases. 
DISCUSSION
Our findings relate to the emerging literature on user entrepreneurship which shares with an effectuation view on entrepreneurship theory the perspective that opportunities are created given a set of means (Read et al., 2009) , here, the user experience. In this section we discuss where and how our propositions resonate with existing theory or depart from it.
Our finding that industry entry occurs in two phases extends existing work on user entrepreneurship (Baldwin et al., 2006; Shah and Tripsas, 2007) in that it separates the user innovator from the user entrepreneur while describing a coherent process of user entrepreneurship. A user innovator may enable phase one by extending the use of a product or technology (von Hippel, 2005; Faulkner and Runde, 2009 ), in our case enabling a video game to be used as a tool for animation production. Phase two may evolve without major user innovations if user entrepreneurs draw on an existing innovation for their own use and for later commercialization. Nevertheless, a deep familiarity with the use of the innovation was a prerequisite for commercialization for all entrepreneurs in our sample.
Propositions in the light of existing theory
Proposition 1. Some authors have argued that firms frequently solicit the use of their knowledge assets for a licensing fee (Chesbrough, 2003; Arora et al., 2001) . Uncompensated tolerance of asset exploitation has been documented for cases of informal know-how trading (von Hippel, 1987) , and in areas where participating firms do not compete directly and find it beneficial to support each other (Henkel, 2006; Dahlander, 2007) . User entrepreneurs who deploy proprietary assets depend on the owner's tolerance of the application of these assets for commercialization.
Our cases extend previous research on selective sharing and tolerance toward application by demonstrating the potential relevance of assets for user entrepreneurs' entry into commercial marketplaces. They also document a nascent group of firms that contribute to developing a new genre in the industry they enter, which underscores the novelty of their products and the associated risks of IP infringement.
Proposition 2. The innovation literature has so far generated only limited insights into the commercial use of selectively shared assets. We show that selective sharing may apply to different types of asset (game engine, artwork, toolkits, etc.), which in turn represent different trade-offs for the user entrepreneur in terms of gaining access to, or substituting for, the asset. We observe that while user innovators frequently make unauthorized use of copyright work (as described by Lee, 2008) , user entrepreneurs display great sensitivity when working with others' copyright-protected work. They either secure owners' explicit permission to create and distribute Machinima using video game artwork, or they completely re-create artwork to avoid conflict over intellectual property rights. Commercializing with others' assets in a new industry is a facet of the user entrepreneurship process not yet described by the literature.
Proposition 3. An important finding in the user innovation literature is that users tend to organize their innovation projects in communities (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; Shah, 2006; von Hippel, 2007) . Members of these communities bring their individual domain knowledge to bear on technical problems, share solutions, promote their work, and develop and improve on technology (Franke & Shah, 2003; Jeppesen & Molin, 2003) . As users who become entrepreneurs and enter a new industry, the firms in our sample provide a unique opportunity to observe where knowledge is sourced and to distinguish between knowledge of production methods, application or development of complementary assets, and domain knowledge. Little is known about this distinction in the user innovation literature, which is vague about when knowledge emerges from a user community and when it needs to be acquired through hiring, or as part of the founding team.
Within user communities, members share and exchange experience with peers from other knowledge domains (Lee & Cole, 2003; Spaeth et al., 2008) . Kogut and Zander (1992) suggested studying how firms combine knowledge from internal as well as external sources for innovation (see also Schumpeter, 1934) . Successful innovators need the ability to identify external knowledge as an important input to innovation and commercialization, and must have the capability of combining new and existing knowledge (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Brockman & Morgan, 2003; Chirico & Salvato, 2008) . Users are considered a source of domain knowledge from ideation to complete product development (von Hippel, 1988; Baldwin et al. 2006; Ogawa and Piller, 2006; Füller et al., 2007) ; however, production methods are frequently considered proprietary (Henkel, 2006: 962) . We identify the types and sources of knowledge combined by user entrepreneurs and propose ways in which a user community provides insights into the production technology for Machinima. By developing and evolving the use of video games for animation production, the community participates in entry into a new industry.
The firms in our sample exchange insights about video games in user communities (Cohendet & Simon, 2007) and hire market insiders to acquire domain knowledge. At the same time, they develop proprietary production knowledge, such as experience in narrative development and plotting, or post-production techniques. Revealing of knowledge by user entrepreneurs depends on the industry context, in that production tools-the application of game engines for Machinima production-are more liberally shared within the user community than production skills, such as cinematography and story development, key elements for revenue generation in the animation industry.
Proposition 4. When building new ventures in an industry, entrepreneurs need domain knowledge relevant to commercialization (Michael et al., 2002) . When entering new industries, domain knowledge about target markets plays a key role in commercializing innovations. The case of Machinima shows that users' experience can translate into an ability to apply tools that serve as complementary assets in a new industry, and that a combination with domain knowledge enables them to commercialize their products. This finding departs from the literature on user innovation and user entrepreneurship, which assumes users' stronghold to be their domain of experience, their access to knowledge generated by their practice as users, as well as their network (Luthje et al., 2005; von Hippel, 2007) . Our sample suggests that users' realm of entrepreneurial activity extends beyond the market where initial user innovation could be observed (the video game industry) to include other industries and the creation of new market fragments.
A Summary of Stakeholders and Activities
In exploring the case of Machinima, we studied a new genre and a growing community of film and gaming enthusiasts. Table 3 provides an overview and summary of the stakeholders involved and their activities before and during the phases of commercialization described by our model.
User innovation began before the users became entrepreneurs and the stories of their businesses unfolded. Our data cover the beginnings of user innovation in this field and the birth of the genre, since many of the individuals who went on to become entrepreneurs are today considered Machinima pioneers (Paul Marino, Hugh Hancock, Burnie Burns, Anna Kang, and others). They reported their first encounters with the technologies of recording and sharing game play, the creativity these spurred, and the first teams they formed to manage early productions.
In our account of the propositions, some stakeholders' positions were omitted for the sake of brevity. However, more detail about the roles played by the video game companies and the audience may facilitate the testing of our model in other contexts. We convey a comprehensive account of the Machinima case, reaching back as far as possible in its history, to open the possibility for others to discover and identify nascent markets and industries by recognizing user activity and behavior in terms of knowledge acquisition and re-interpretation of assets.
The columns in Table 3 show critical activities within the two relevant industries, video games and motion picture. The rows follow the stakeholders over time, going from top to bottom, from an enabling phase to user innovation and then to the two commercialization phases covered by our propositions. The relevant stakeholders, apart from user entrepreneurs, include gamers who are forming a community of Machinimators (the lead user community), incumbent firms in the video games industry, and consumers of videos. Shaded cells contain user entrepreneurs' key activities, as described above, and may serve as reference points to compare with other stakeholders' activities. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT
Our findings contribute to the literatures on user entrepreneurship and (remotely) strategy, in that we motivate future research on entrants keeping a low profile to overcome entry barriers. Four contributions stand out.
First, a central finding of our study relates to user entrepreneurship. Industry entry by user entrepreneurs could be observed to occur in two phases (see Figure 1 and Table 1 ). This demonstrated that entrants could outmaneuver entry barriers by operating under the radar of incumbent firms before commercializing. Although they were already distributing film, users did not appear as commercial players. Once they had gained a foothold through their audience, users began to commercialize. Their two-phase entry into the animation industry avoided apparent conflict over IP rights by first relying on informal copyright practices (see Lee, 2008) , and also avoided large investments in established distribution channels by using the Internet. Third, our theory contributes to a differentiated understanding of the user's role in technology diffusion. Users, the Machinimators in our case, have radically changed the use of video games by using them as stage and input for animation production rather than game play. Faulkner and Runde (2009) describe the diffusion of these user-triggered changes in products. Video games contain both technology (the physics engine that creates a basis for the virtual world) and art (the artwork that makes the virtual world visible and allows for the experience of sensations inside the virtual world). The two can be separated, as we demonstrated, and their diffusion follows slightly different paths, given their creators' choices to protect them from exploitation in different contexts. The new context is animation; since the advent of Machinima in the late 1990s, video games have been used for animation production in various ways. Hence, users diffuse technologies across industry boundaries depending on their assessment of the components of the technology, on their own costs of re-creating it, and on the outcome of the negotiations with the owners of the IP rights to the technology, which may in turn be a question of timing.
Fourth, our study raises a few important questions about atomistic versus collective user entrepreneurship and the logic of selective revealing (Henkel, 2006) . While the user community of Machinimators was instrumental in diffusing knowledge about the application of video games to animation production, process and business knowledge (sequel and storyline development, distribution channels) were revealed to a far lesser extent. Gamer communities that became Machinima communities preceded commercial efforts, a finding that corresponds to other areas of user entrepreneurship (Baldwin et al., 2006 , Shah & Tripsas, 2007 . What is new, in our case, is that the choice of industry lies in the nature of the users' activity. We were not observing a few renegade firms that decided to venture into an unknown industry; ours were entrepreneurial users who took innovation one step further and commercialized in the industry most akin to the work they had done: animation. The Machinima community does not discuss game play or extensions of games for gaming's sake but develops ever more sophisticated knowledge that combines the use of games and cinematography, as the quote by Friedrich Kirschner (above) illustrates.
Some limitations apply to this study. First, while the Machinima phenomenon is growing rapidly, generalization of the propositions to areas other than games must be tested in future research.
Second, two effects were almost impossible to disentangle and could jeopardize the future applicability of the theory to contexts other than virtual environments: the diffusion of broadband access and advances in distribution technology for media content over the Internet. The popularity of Machinima, and thus the commercial viability of the firms studied, might be connected to the general trend of viewing film over the Internet. Finally, Machinima represents a very recent phenomenon that provides scarce data on the survival of our sample firms (none of which can demonstrate a track record of more than ten years). Game companies could eventually cease selective sharing of engines and tools and venture into the motion picture industry themselves, or the audience could turn away from Machinima. However, given the Machinima firms' diverse sources of revenue, their dependence on game companies is limited. Future research needs to follow up on the phenomenon.
To be continued …
Our analysis covered a number of topics beyond and in addition to the process model, which we cut in favor of length and accessibility (see also Table 3 ). We thus propose an agenda for future research. Successful industry entry implies a gain in market share by the new entrant at the expense of incumbent firms. To date, Machinima is insignificant compared to the revenues generated by big players in the motion picture industry. Measuring the market share to justify successful entry thus proves impractical. Machinima represents an emerging genre in film today and user entrepreneurs, entering under the radar, created a new niche in the animation industry, fragmenting existing markets. The new niche is characterized by low barriers to entry, which in turn enable further talent to enter the Machinima market. With the continuously advancing graphical capabilities of video games, the full potential of this market might yet to be unleashed.
How this industry will evolve over time, and whether it will capture market share or disentangle from the conventional media markets, remains to be seen. Machinima represents a fertile ground for studying the strategic impact of industry entry and market fragmentation on incumbents as well as new entrants.
The cases demonstrate that learning can occur in phase one, prior to full entry. Hence, important industry entry barriers do not deter user entry and may need reconsideration in terms of their effectiveness for this type of activity (Porter, 1980; Lieberman, 1987) . If de novo entrants can innovate without entering an industry commercially (users learn by experimenting with products and processes and from peers), learning curve effects could in fact moderate other entry barriers.
Opportunity costs of users are rather low, so could offset entry costs, while they rise with commercialization when the user entrepreneur engages in firm foundation. This eventually leads to the question of which entry barriers remain intact during phase one, industry entry, and which during phase two, entry to the commercial marketplace-a question we defer to future research.
Interaction with their customers helped user entrepreneurs to improve their products and correct flaws. Posting Machinima on sites with social software features (such as commenting and rating) allowed user entrepreneurs to read viewers' comments within minutes. 14 Rooster Teeth encouraged short feedback cycles by establishing a dual release structure granting sponsors early access to new episodes. Sponsors' feedback thus enabled the production team to correct flaws prior to the public rollout. Consumer motivation to engage in such activities, as well as the impact of social software features to support these processes, need close examination in order to implement value-adding IT solutions. The nature of this interaction contributes to the continuous blurring of boundaries between the traditionally separated media of film, Internet, and video gaming.
Firms in one industry increasingly witness how freely or restrictively shared tools and assets can be used in another industry. This can be both beneficial and detrimental to the core business and thus needs close monitoring. In general, our sample suggests that positive effects dominate for game industry incumbents. Ill-considered handling of IP, whether in the form of a too lenient or too strict position on exploitation of complementary assets in users' target industries, can negatively affect the core business. Game companies might want to take a clear stance and encourage or discourage users from certain practices from the point of product launch. While game companies did this rigorously for their home industry, they largely ignored setting up directives for user entrepreneurs' target industries. These policies can define both the kind of exploitation and possible target industries.
Laws differ about the fair use of IP across countries and create uncertainties for users, as our study confirmed. Users can be frustrated with EULAs and select games based on their availability and flexibility of use. EULAs do not necessarily need to be rewritten, nor will individual contracts and agreements resolve the problem in the long run. Amendments can give certain rights back to users, as happened on Blizzard's World of Warcraft site where the company made a 180-degree policy change in 2007 and started to share assets for certain uses selectively.
Microsoft issued a similar license in the same year. 15 A recent analysis by Lee (2008) documents the rise of informal copyright practices for user-generated content. This "warming to unauthorized use" (Lee, 2008) includes commercial applications and may, given appropriate and balanced policy (Roquilly, 2010) , influence the behavior of both users and entrepreneurs.
However, this is an emerging legal practice and the firms in our sample avoided building their ventures on the unauthorized use of copyright work.
Innovation policy needs to take into account the way protected assets can be used across industries. Crucially, the transaction costs to create legal agreements should be lowered so that rights holders have incentives to enter negotiations with prospective entrepreneurs. Today, these incentives frequently point the other way and lead to wholesale decline. Recent Internet technology, such as video compression and distribution, allows new talent to create entertainment products on a broad scale (Eliashberg et al., 2006) . Encouraging innovation in this domain calls for more flexible and informal copyright agreements, since the current uncertainty may deter user innovators and user entrepreneurs. Table A1 : Coding Scheme Table A2 : Interview Partners
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